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BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH, THE GREAT WRIT, AND THE
POWER TO "SAY WHAT THE LAW IS"
Emily Garcia Uhrig*
I. INTRODUCTION
At the conference for this symposium issue, I spoke on the
constitutionality of section 7 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006
("MCA"),' which by its terms stripped the privilege of habeas corpus
from foreign national detainees held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.2 At the
time of the conference, the D.C. Circuit, in Boumediene v. Bush,3 had
upheld the provision against constitutional challenge under the
Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution.4 The Supreme Court
declined to review the decision.5 My remarks were made in that context.
Two months after the symposium, the Supreme Court reversed course
and granted review of the D.C. Circuit's decision.6 On June 12, 2008,
the Supreme Court issued a lengthy, divided opinion concluding in part
that MCA section 7 violates the Suspension Clause and conflicts with the
separation of powers structure of government enshrined in the
Constitution.'
This article provides a brief overview of the history of litigation that
led to the enactment of section 7 of the MCA, and an assessment of the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. I
am very grateful for the helpful comments of John Sims.
1. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600,
2635-36, invalidated by Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
2. See id.
3. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 2229
(2008).
4. Id. at 992, 994. The Suspension Clause states that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
5. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007).
6. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007).
7. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240, 2277 (2008).
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Supreme Court's analysis in Boumediene regarding the reach of the
Suspension Clause. The decision, at its core, is an affirmation of
separation of powers principles.8 It affirms the Framers' creation of a
tripartite system of government in which each branch checks and
balances the others. Section 7 of the MCA was an effort by the
legislative and executive branches to excise the judiciary in order to
avoid the "inconvenience" of judicial review of individual decisions to
detain foreign nationals at Guantanamo Bay. The Court struck down the
effort as constitutionally untenable. 9
II. BACKGROUND
A. Legislative and Litigation History
On September 11, 2001, members of the al Qaeda terrorist network
used hijacked commercial airliners as missiles to attack the World Trade
Center towers and the Pentagon.'0 Approximately 3,000 people lost their
lives in the attacks." A week later, Congress passed the "Authorization
for Use of Military Force" ("AUMF")' 2 resolution, which empowered
the President to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks ... or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations, or persons."' 3 Shortly thereafter, President Bush invoked
his authority under the AUMF to deploy U.S. military forces to
Afghanistan to battle "al Qaeda and the Taliban regime that had
supported it."'14 Hundreds of foreign nationals were captured abroad by
U.S. forces during these hostilities, or captured and handed over to U.S.
forces by the Northern Alliance and others, and removed for detention at
the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 5
8. Id. at 2247.
9. Id. at 2240.
10. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,470 (2004).
11. Id.
12. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
13. Id. § 2(a), 115 Stat. at224.
14. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470.
15. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 568 (2006), superseded by statute,
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, as recognized
in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
[Vol. 33
The Great Writ
The base at Guantanamo occupies forty-five "square miles of land
and water along the southeastern coast of Cuba." 16 Pursuant to a 1903
Lease Agreement with Cuba, "'the United States recognizes the
continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over the
[leased areas],' while 'the Republic of Cuba consents that during the
period of the occupation by the United States ... the United States shall
exercise complete jurisdiction and control over and within said areas."'
1 7
In 1934, the United States and Cuba entered into a treaty providing that,
unless the parties agreed otherwise, the lease would continue as long as
the United States did not abandon the Guantanamo naval base. 18
On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a comprehensive
military order entitled "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism."19  The order governed any
noncitizen for whom the President determined that "there is reason to
believe" that he or she (1) "is or was" a member of al Qaeda or (2) has
engaged or participated in terrorist activities aimed at or harmful to the
United States.20 Any such person "shall, when tried, be tried by military
commission for any and all offenses triable by military commission that
such individual is alleged to have committed, and may be punished in
accordance with the penalties provided under applicable law, including
life imprisonment or death. 21
In 2002, a number of foreign nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay
initiated legal proceedings in federal district court raising claims related
to the legality of their respective detentions.22 The district court
16. Rasul, 542 U.S. at471.
17. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval
Stations, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, Feb. 23, 1903, T.S. No. 418).
18. Id. (citing Treaty Defining Relations with Cuba, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, May 29,
1934, 48 Stat. 1682, 1683).
19. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2001), reprinted in 10 U.S.C.
§ 801 (2006).
20. Id. § 2, 3 C.F.R. at 919.
21. Id. § 4, 3 C.F.R. at 919-20.
22. See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom.
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002),
rev'd sub nom. Al Odah, v. United States, 103 Fed. App'x 676 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per
curiam); Habib v. Bush, No. 02-5284 (D.C. Cir. June 10, 2002). In Al Odah, family
members of twelve Kuwaiti national detainees sought a declaratory judgment and an
injunction ordering that they be informed of the charges against them and be permitted to
consult with legal counsel. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1136. In Rasul, three detainees, through
next friend relatives, challenged the legality of their detentions under the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment, international law, military regulations,
2008]
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concluded that all of the detainees' claims implicated the lawfulness of
their custody, and thus were cognizable only in habeas corpus.23 The
court thereupon dismissed the claims for lack of jurisdiction.24  Citing
Johnson v. Eisentrager,25 the court concluded that it did not have
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus for any aliens detained
outside the sovereign territory of the United States.26  At that time, 28
U.S.C. § 2241(a), the habeas statute, provided that "[w]rits of habeas
corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the
district courts and any circuit judge within their respective
jurisdictions. 27
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding "that no court in this
country has jurisdiction to grant habeas relief, under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, to
the Guantanamo detainees. 28  The court of appeals reasoned that
because Guantanamo Bay was not part of the sovereign territory of the
United States, but rather, was on land leased from Cuba, it was not
within the "respective jurisdictions" of the district court or any other
court in the United States.29
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed in Rasul v. Bush,30 holding that §
2241 extends to aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay.3' The Court held
that although the detainees were beyond the district court's jurisdiction,
the district court's jurisdiction over the detainees' custodians was
sufficient to provide subject matter jurisdiction under § 2241.32 The
the War Powers Clause, and Article I of the Constitution due to the President's alleged
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 1136-37. In Habib, the detainee sought
habeas relief under "the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and other
constitutional provisions, the Alien Tort Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, due
process under international law, and United States military regulations." Id. at 1137.
23. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 62-64.
24. Id. at 56.
25. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
26. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 72-73.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2000).
28. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom.
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
29. Id. at 1141-43. The court also dismissed the non-habeas claims, holding that the
"'privilege of litigation"' does not apply to aliens in military custody outside of 'any
territory over which the United States is sovereign."' Id. at 1144 (quoting Eisentrager,
339 U.S. at 777-78).
30. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
31. Id. at 484.
32. Id. at 483-84. The Court also reversed the lower court's finding that it lacked
jurisdiction over the non-habeas claims because the federal question statute and Alien
Tort Act lacked any provision that categorically excludes aliens outside of the United
[Vol. 33
Court remanded the cases to the D.C. Circuit,33 which in turn remanded
to the district court.
34
Congress responded to Rasul by passing the Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005 ("DTA"),35 which was signed into law on December 30, 2005.36
The DTA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to include subsection (e), which
stated that "[e]xcept as provided in section 1005 of the [DTA], no court,
justice, or judge" has jurisdiction over
(1) an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on
behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; or
(2) any other action against the United States or its agents
relating to any aspect of the detention by the Department of
Defense of an alien at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who
(A) is currently in military custody; or
(B) has been determined by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit... to have been properly
detained as an enemy combatant.37
Subsections (e)(2) and (e)(3) of section 1005 provide the D.C. Circuit
with exclusive judicial review over decisions by the Combatant Status
Review Tribunal ("CSRTs") and military commissions.
38
In June 2006, the Supreme Court decided Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,39
States from bringing such claims. Id. at 484-85.
33. Id. at 485.
34. See Al Odah v. United States, 103 Fed. App'x 676 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
35. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat.
2739 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. at 2742 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(2006)).
38. Id. § 1005(e)(2)-(3), 119 Stat. at 2742-43. "CSRTs are used to determine whether
individual detainees should continue to be classified as enemy combatants." Dimitri D.
Portnoi, Resorting to Extraordinary Writs: How the All Writs Act Rises to Fill the Gaps
in the Rights of Enemy Combatants, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 293, 315 n.133 (2008).
39. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), superseded by statute, Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, as recognized in
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni
national, had been captured during hostilities between the United States and the Taliban
in November 2001 and transported to Guantanamo Bay in June 2002. Id. at 566. "Over a
year later, the President deemed him eligible for trial by military commission for then-
unspecified crimes. After another year had passed, Hamdan was charged with one count
of conspiracy 'to commit.., offenses triable by military commission."' Id.
2008] The Great Writ
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which held, in relevant part, that the DTA did not strip habeas
jurisdiction from federal courts for cases pending at the time of the
DTA's enactment. 40  Rather, § 2241, as amended, only applied
prospectively.
41
In response to Hamdan, Congress passed the Military Commissions
Act of 2006 ("MCA"),42 which President Bush signed into law on
October 17, 2006., 3 Section 7(a) of the MCA, entitled "Habeas Corpus
Matters," amended § 2241(e) to provide:
(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear
or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or
on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been
determined by the United States to have been properly detained
as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
(2) Except as provided in [sections 1005(e)(2) and (e)(3) of
the DTA] no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to
hear or consider any other action against the United States or its
agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment,
trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was
detained by the United States and has been determined by the
United States to have been properly detained as an enemy
combatant or is awaiting such determination.
44
Section 7(b) of the MCA made subsection (a) applicable "to all
cases, without exception, pending on or after the date of the enactment of
[the MCA] which relate to any aspect of the detention, transfer,
treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an alien detained by the
United States since September 11, 200 1.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held, as a threshold matter, that the MCA
applied to the detainees' petitions in that their "lawsuits fall within the
subject matter covered by the amended § 2241(e); each case relates to an
'aspect' of detention and each deals with the detention of an 'alien' after
September 11, 2001.,46 The court turned next to the question of whether
40. Id. at 584.
41. Id.
42. Military Commissions Act, 120 Stat. 2600.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 7(a), 120 Stat. at 2635-36, invalidated by Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229.
45. Id. § 7(b), 120 Stat. at 2636, invalidated by Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229.
46. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 986 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev'don other grounds,
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the MCA was an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus.47 A two-judge majority of the court of appeals concluded it was
not.48
The majority reasoned that the Suspension Clause protects only "the
writ 'as it existed in 1789,' when the first Judiciary Act created the
federal courts and granted jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus.
49
The court concluded that the historical reach of the writ in England prior
to 1789 would not have extended the privilege to aliens outside of the
United States. 50 The majority further cited Johnson v. Eisentrager51 as
"end[ing] any doubt about the scope of common law habeas" in that the
Eisentrager court observed:
We are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any other
country where the writ is known, has issued it on behalf of an
alien enemy who, at no relevant time and in no stage of his
captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction. Nothing in
the text of the Constitution extends such a right, nor does
anything in our statutes.52
The court rejected the detainees' attempt to distinguish Eisentrager,
which involved German nationals captured, convicted of war crimes, and
detained at a U.S. military base in Germany who sought a writ of habeas
corpus.53 The court concluded that "[a]ny distinction between the naval
base at Guantanamo Bay and the prison in Landsberg, Germany, where
the petitioners in Eisentrager were held, is immaterial to the application
of the Suspension Clause., 5 4 "The 'determination of sovereignty over an
area ... is for the legislative and executive departments."' 55 Here, under
the terms of the DTA, "'United States,' when used in a geographic
sense[J... does not include the United States Naval Station,
128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (noting that "[e]veryone who has followed the interaction
between Congress and the Supreme Court knows full well that one of the primary
purposes of the MCA was to overrule Hamdan").
47. Id. at 988.
48. Id. at 994.
49. Id. at 988 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)).
50. Id. at 990.
51. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
52. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 768.
53. Id. at 991-92.
54. Id. at 992.
55. Id. (quoting Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 380 (1948)).
2008]
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Guantanamo Bay, Cuba., 5
6
The majority further rejected the detainees' claims to constitutional
rights, observing that "[t]he law of this circuit is that a 'foreign entity
without property or presence in this country has no constitutional rights,
under the Due Process Clause or otherwise."' 57 In so ruling, the majority
rejected the detainees' argument that the Suspension Clause functions as
a limitation on congressional power rather than a constitutional right.58
In a strong dissent, Judge Rogers rejected the majority's conclusion
that the MCA's withdrawal of federal jurisdiction over Guantanamo-
detainee habeas petitions can be reconciled with the Suspension Clause. 59
She agreed with the detainees that the Suspension Clause operates as a
constraint on Congress's powers, limiting removal of the writ to times of
rebellion or invasion unless Congress provides for an adequate,
alternative remedy.60 Thus, because Congress had neither set forth an
adequate, alternative remedy in the DTA, nor made the requisite findings
to suspend the writ, the MCA was void as unconstitutional.6'
The detainees filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.62
On April 2, 2007, the Court denied the petition, by a vote of six to
three.63 Justices Stevens and Kennedy wrote in explanation of the denial
that "[d]espite the obvious importance of the issues raised in these cases,
we are persuaded that traditional rules governing our decision of
constitutional questions and our practice of requiring the exhaustion of
available remedies as a precondition to accepting jurisdiction over
applications for the writ of habeas corpus" warranted denial of the
petition at that juncture. 64 But the Justices noted that if the detainees
"later seek to establish that the Government has unreasonably delayed
proceedings under the [DTA], or some other and ongoing injury,
alternative means exist for us to consider our jurisdiction over the
allegations made by petitioners before the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals. 65 The
56. Id. (quoting Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X,
§ 1005(g), 119 Stat. 2739, 2743 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note (2006)).
57. Id. (quoting People's Mohahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17,
22 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
58. Id. at 993.
59. Id. at 994-95 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 995.
61. Id.
62. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007).
63. Id.
64. Id. (citation omitted).
65. Id. (citation omitted).
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Justices further underscored that, as always, the denial of certiorari was
not an indication of any opinion as to the merits of the cases.66
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, dissented
from the denial of certiorari. 67 They felt that the questions as to whether
the MCA deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to consider the detainees'
habeas claims and, if so, whether that deprivation is constitutional,
warranted the Court's "immediate attention." 68 The dissent noted that
"the 'province' of the Great Writ, 'shaped to guarantee the most
fundamental of all rights, is to provide an effective and speedy
instrument by which judicial inquiry may be had into the legality of the
detention of a person.',, 69 Yet, the petitioners had been held for more
than five years without judicial review of their habeas claims. 70 First,
immediate review could either prevent further, unjustified detention or
could provide clarification of the parameters of the Suspension Clause
and the writ of habeas corpus with respect to the detainees. 71 Second, the
dissent noted the "plausible" argument that the D.C. Circuit's opinion
was contrary to Rasul v. Bush, in which the Court observed "that
Guantanamo was under the complete control and jurisdiction of the
United States. 72  Notably, the Court in Rasul had observed that the
"[a]pplication of the habeas statute to persons detained at the base is
consistent with the historical reach of the writ of habeas corpus. 7 3 The
dissent also noted that the fact that the petitioners in Boumediene were
foreign nationals of countries other than Afghanistan who were seized
outside of the theatre of hostilities with al Qaeda and the Taliban may
impact the availability of habeas corpus.74
Finally, the dissent observed that if petitioners have the right to seek
a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, the Court would have to consider
whether the procedures set forth in the DTA that provide for review in
the D.C. Circuit are a constitutionally adequate substitute for habeas
corpus.75 The D.C. Circuit in Boumediene had not reached this issue.76
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1479 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,480-81 (2004)).
73. Id. (quoting Rasul, 542 U.S. at 481-82).
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B. The April 2007 Symposium
Within weeks of the Court's denial of certiorari in Boumediene, the
Oklahoma City University School of Law held its national symposium
entitled Congress's New-and Future-Law of Counterterrorism:
Legislating Military Commissions, the Powers of Surveillance and the
Role of the Courts in America's War on Terrorism.77 Recognizing the
enormity of the questions left unresolved by the Court's denial of
certiorari, the symposium included a panel entitled The Law of
Suspending the Law: When is Suspension of Habeas Corpus-or the
Exercise of Other Emergency Powers-Compatible with the
Constitution? Professor Trevor Morrison of Columbia Law School and I
participated on the panel.78
My comments aligned closely with Judge Rodgers' dissent in the
D.C. Circuit, rather than the two-judge majority's opinion, in that I
disagreed with the government's argument that Supreme Court
precedent, i.e., the Insular Cases and Johnson v. Eisentrager, provided
firm precedent for denying Guantanamo detainees the privilege of habeas
corpus. Rather, I contended that the Suspension Clause does not permit
such a measure by the legislative and executive branches. Habeas corpus
gives muscle to the doctrine of separation of powers and the due process
principle of fundamental fairness enshrined in the Constitution. Where
the executive decides to detain an individual, absent extraordinary
circumstances, such person is entitled to judicial review through exercise
of the privilege of habeas corpus. Moreover, at its core, habeas corpus
embodies the due process guarantee of fundamental fairness in that the
writ shall issue and the detainee be released from custody if the
government cannot show sufficient reason for that detention.
C. Grant of Certiorari
On June 29, 2007, less than three months after the symposium, the
Supreme Court reversed itself and granted the detainees' petition for
rehearing of the Court's April 2 denial of certiorari. 79 The Court agreed
to review (1) whether the MCA's habeas-stripping provision applies to
77. See OCU Law, Counterterrorism Symposium 2007, http://www.okcu.edu/
law/newsandevents/counterterrorism.php (last visited Jan. 6, 2009) (providing
information and an overview on the symposium).
78. Id.
79. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007).
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cases pending on the date of enactment of that statute;8° and (2) if so,
whether the removal of habeas corpus as a remedy for alien detainees at
Guantanamo violates the Suspension Clause of the Constitution."
III. BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH
On June 12, 2008, at the end of its term, the Court issued its decision
reversing the D.C. Circuit's ruling.82 The Court unanimously agreed
with the D.C. Circuit that MCA section 7 denies federal courts
jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed by Guantanamo detainees
that were pending on the date of its enactment.83 Thus, if the statute is
constitutionally sound, the D.C. Circuit's dismissal of the petitions would
be proper.84
The Court then turned to the more difficult question: whether MCA
section 7's denial of the privilege of habeas corpus to Guantanamo
detainees violates the Suspension Clause of the Constitution. 85  In a
seventy-page opinion, reflective of the complexity of the issue, a five-
Justice majority concluded that it does.
86
As a threshold matter, the Court concluded that the history of the
privilege of habeas corpus in England and the doctrine of separation of
powers in the U.S. Constitution inform the reach and purpose of the
Suspension Clause.87 The origins of the writ date to Magna Carta, which
"decreed that no man would be imprisoned contrary to the law of the
land.' 8 The writ of habeas corpus became the mechanism for realizing
Magna Carta's promise. 89 At first, the writ functioned only to gain
compliance with the Crown's laws, rather than to protect the rights of
individual citizens. 90 But by the 1600's, the writ had become "less an
80. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241-44 (2008).
81. See id. at 2240.
82. Id. at 2277.
83. Id. at 2242.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2244.
86. Id. at 2240, 2262.
87. Id. at 2244.
88. Id. (citing Magna Carta, 1215, in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY
ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF
RIGHTS 1, 17 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1978)).
89. Id. (citing 9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 112 (1926)).
90. Id. at 2244-45 (citing Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension
Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575
(2008)).
2008] The Great Writ
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instrument of the King's power and more a restraint upon it." 91 English
courts or Parliament, however, often suspended habeas corpus during
periods "of political unrest, to the anguish of the imprisoned and the
outrage of those in sympathy with them."92  The King's abuse of
authority, and the interregnum that ensued, ultimately led to Parliament's
passage of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. 93  That Act, though
vulnerable to further suspension in England, became the model for
habeas statutes enacted in the thirteen American colonies.94
"The Framers viewed freedom from unlawful restraint as a
fundamental precept of liberty, and they understood the writ of habeas
corpus as a vital instrument to secure that freedom." 95  The proven
vulnerability of the Great Writ in England in part inspired the separation
of powers structure of government enshrined in the Constitution. 96 The
Court observed:
Th[e] history [of the writ]... no doubt confirmed [the
Framers'] view that pendular swings to and away from
individual liberty were endemic to undivided, uncontrolled
power. The Framers' inherent distrust of governmental power
was the driving force behind the constitutional plan that
allocated powers among three independent branches. This
design serves not only to make Government accountable but also
to secure individual liberty. 97
The Court noted that the ratification debates made clear the Framers'
intent that, by ensuring the right of judicial review of executive decisions
to detain individuals, the writ would function as a check on governmental
power over the citizenry. 98  Alexander Hamilton warned that "'the
practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the favorite
and most formidable instruments of tyranny."' 99 "The Clause protects
91. Id. at 2245 (citing Rex A. Collings, Jr., Habeas Corpus for Convicts-
Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CAL. L. REV. 335, 336 (1952)).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2245-46.
94. Id. (citing Collings, Jr., supra note 91, at 338-39).
95. Id. at 2244.
96. Id. at 2246.
97. Id. (citing Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996)).
98. Id. at 2246-47.
99. Id. at 2247 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 512 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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the rights of the detained by affirming the duty and authority of the
Judiciary to call the jailer to account."100 "It ensures that, except during
periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will have a time-tested
device, the writ, to maintain the 'delicate balance of governance' that is
itself the surest safeguard of liberty." 1° 1 In this approach, the Framers
sought to avoid the cyclical abuses that the writ endured in England,
where habeas corpus was not embedded in a government structure
defined by the doctrine of separation of powers.
10
2
After concluding that the writ is an integral component of separation
of powers doctrine, the Court turned to the question of whether it
protects foreign nationals detained in Guantanamo.'0 3 In 2001, the Court
observed in INS v. St. Cyr,14 that "at the absolute minimum, the
Suspension Clause protects the writ 'as it existed [when the Constitution
was drafted and ratified]."" 0' 5 Thus, again, the Court reviewed history to
assess whether the Framers intended the writ to extend to foreign
nationals captured and detained outside of the United States "during a
time of serious threats to our Nation's security.' 10 6 The Court noted it
had to be "careful not to foreclose the possibility that the protections of
the Suspension Clause have expanded along with post-1789
developments that define the present scope of the writ.' '10 7 The Court
concluded that the historical record of the writ in English common law
was inconclusive. 0 8  It noted that "given the unique status of
Guantanamo Bay and the particular dangers of terrorism in the modern
age, the common-law courts simply may not have confronted cases with
close parallels to this one."' 10 9
With no clear directive from the Framers as to the geographic reach
of the Great Writ, the Court evaluated the common law. The Court
accepted the Government's contention that Cuba, rather than "the United
States, [has] dejure sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay.' 10 But as it had
in Rasul, the Court noted "the obvious and uncontested fact that the
100. Id. (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973)).
101. Id. (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004)).
102. Id.
103. Id. at2248.
104. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
105. Id. at 301 (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1996)).
106. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2248, 2248-5 1.
107. Id. at 2248 (citing St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 300-0 1).
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United States, by virtue of its complete jurisdiction and control over the
base, maintains de facto sovereignty over this territory.""' Thus, the
Court rejected the Government's argument that "the Constitution
necessarily stops where dejure sovereignty ends."
' 12
The Court evaluated the extraterritorial reach of habeas corpus under
the common law. 113  The Court first grappled with the issue of
extraterritorial application of the Constitution at the turn of the twentieth
century by reviewing a series of cases now known as the Insular
Cases. 1 4  In these cases, the Court considered the extent of the
application of the Constitution to noncontiguous U.S. Territories,
specifically, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines, and Hawaii. 1 5 From
the Insular Cases emerged "the doctrine of territorial incorporation,
under which the Constitution applies in full in incorporated Territories
surely destined for statehood but only in part in unincorporated
Territories., ' 1 6  In light of the "practical difficulties of enforcing all
constitutional provisions 'always and everywhere,' the Court devised in
the Insular Cases a doctrine that allowed it to use its power sparingly and
where it would be most needed.""' ' But as early as "1922, the Court took
for granted that even in unincorporated Territories the Government of the
United States was bound to provide to noncitizen inhabitants 'guarantees
of certain fundamental personal rights declared in the Constitution.""'
8
The Court has interpreted the Insular Cases to mean "that whether a
constitutional provision has extraterritorial effect depends upon the
'particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible
alternatives which Congress had before it' and, in particular, whether
judicial enforcement of the provision would be 'impracticable and
anomalous.""'19  Thus, in Reid v. Covert,120 a plurality of the Court
concluded that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply to American
citizens tried outside the United States. 12  Each Justice of the plurality
111. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004)).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 2253-54.
115. Id. at 2253.
116. Id. at 2254 (citing Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 143 (1904)).
117. Id. at 2255 (citation omitted) (quoting Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312
(1922)).
118. Id. (quoting Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312).
119. Id. (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74-75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
120. Reid, 354 U.S. 1.
121. Id. at 18-19.
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considered the practical difficulties related to the place of confinement. 
122
Practical considerations were front and center in the Court's 1950
decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager.23 There, the Court held that the
privilege of habeas corpus did not extend to enemy aliens convicted of
war crimes and detained at Landsberg prison in Germany during the
Allied Powers' post-World War I occupation.12 4 The Court underscored
"the difficulties of ordering the Government to produce the prisoners in a
habeas . . . proceeding." 12' The Court balanced "the constraints of
military occupation with constitutional necessities."
' 126
The Court in Eisentrager noted that the "prisoners at no relevant
time were within any territory over which the United States is sovereign,
and [that] the scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial and their
punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the
United States." 127 In Boumediene, the Court rejected the Government's
argument that this language supports "a formalistic, sovereignty-based
test" for assessing the Suspension Clause's scope.1 28 The Court noted
that the Eisentrager court understood sovereignty as "a multifaceted
concept," in that its opinion reflected concern with both the formal legal
status of the prison as a "German" prison and the actual degree of control
the United States had over it. 129
The Court in Boumediene noted further that the Government's
argument, if adopted, would be at odds with the functional approach to
the issues of extraterritorial application of the Constitution taken in the
Insular Cases and Reid.1 30 Thus, the "common thread" connecting the
Insular Cases, Eisentrager, and Reid is "the idea that questions of
extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not
formalism."
1 31
The Court observed that, by implication, the Government sought to
have authority to govern an unincorporated territory "without legal
constraint.' ' 32  To accomplish this end, it need only surrender formal
122. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2256-57.
123. Id. at 2257.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769-79 (1950)).
127. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 778.
128. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257-58.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2258.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2258-59.
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sovereignty over an unincorporated territory to a third party and
simultaneously lease it back under terms that provide it with total
control. 33 The Court reacted to this implication in strong terms:
Our basic charter cannot be contracted away like this. The
Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to
acquire, dispose of, and govern territory, not the power to decide
when and where its terms apply .... Abstaining from questions
involving formal sovereignty and territorial governance is one
thing. To hold the political branches have the power to switch
the Constitution on or off at will is quite another.
134
The Court noted that the Government's position, if adopted, "would
permit a striking anomaly in our tripartite system of government, leading
to a regime in which Congress and the President, not this Court, say
'what the law is.""' 135 Thus, the Court emphasized the role of the Great
Writ in enforcing separation of powers principles: "[T]he writ of habeas
corpus is itself an indispensable mechanism for monitoring the
separation of powers. The test for determining the scope of this
provision must not be subject to manipulation by those whose power it is
designed to restrain.'136
Drawing on Eisentrager and the other extraterritoriality opinions, the
Court cited three factors as relevant in assessing the Suspension Clause's
reach: "(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of
the process through which that status determination was made; (2) the
nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and
(3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's entitlement
to the writ.'
137
With respect to the first factor, although the Guantanamo detainees
are foreign nationals, their status as enemy combatants is in question. 138
In Eisentrager, the petitioners were indisputably enemy aliens, having
had military trials and "rigorous adversarial process to test the legality of
their detention."1 39 They were formally charged with detailed factual
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2259.
135. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2259-60.
[Vol. 33
The Great Writ
allegations, had assistance of counsel in defending against the charge,
were able to "introduce evidence on their own behalf, and [were]
permitted to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses."'
140
By contrast, the Guantanamo Bay detainees deny they are enemy
combatants and, though afforded some process in the CSRT proceedings,
have not had trials by military commissions for violations of the laws of
war.141 The CSRT hearings "fall well short of the procedures and
adversarial mechanisms that would eliminate the need for habeas corpus
review."'' 42  A "Personal Representative" is provided to assist the
detainee during the CSRT proceeding, but this individual "is not the
detainee's lawyer or even 'advocate."", 143  Further, the Government's
evidence receives a presumption of validity.' 44  To rebut the
presumption, the detainee may present "reasonably available" evidence,
but this task is severely limited by the detainee's confinement itself and
lack of counsel. 45 Moreover, a detainee may seek review of his status
determination before the court of appeals, but this review process is a
limited one. 146
As for the second relevant factor cited in Boumediene, the detainees,
like the petitioners in Eisentrager, were captured and detained outside
the sovereign territory of the United States. 47 But Guantanamo Bay is
not similiarly situated to Landsberg Prison in 1950.148 In contrast to
Guantanamo Bay, U.S. "control over the [Landsberg] prison ... was
neither absolute nor indefinite."' 149 The prison was under the jurisdiction
of the combined Allied forces and those forces had no plan for a long-
term occupation or displacement of German legal institutions. 50  By
contrast, Guantanamo Bay "is no transient possession. In every practical
sense Guantanamo is not abroad; it is within the constant jurisdiction of
the United States."' 151
Regarding the third relevant factor, the Court was unpersuaded by
140. Id. at 2260.
141. Id. at 2259-60.









151. Id. at 2261 (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004)).
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the costs associated with providing habeas corpus proceedings to the
Guantanamo detainees.152  Moreover, in light of the U.S.'s exclusive
control over Guantanamo Bay, the privilege of habeas corpus poses no
credible threat to the military mission there. 
153
Eisentrager, by contrast, arose during the U.S.'s occupation of
57,000 square miles inhabited by a population of 18 million, when the
United States was supervising the massive reconstruction of Germany.' 
54
American forces in Germany still faced possible threats from the
defeated enemy. 155 Therefore, "the Court was right to be concerned
about judicial interference with the military's efforts to contain 'enemy
elements, guerilla fighters, and 'were-wolves.""' 56  Thus, the Court
concluded, practical considerations did not justify denying the privilege
of habeas corpus to the Guantanamo detainees. 1
57
The Court concluded that the Suspension Clause "of the Constitution
has full effect at Guantanamo Bay."' 158 Before denying the privilege to
the detainees held there, "Congress must act in accordance with the
requirements of the Suspension Clause."'159 Because "[t]he MCA does
not purport to be a formal suspension of the writ," the detainees are
entitled to pursue habeas proceedings "to challenge the legality of their
detention."'
' 60
Lastly, the Court assessed whether the provision allowing for court
of appeals review under the DTA provides an adequate substitute for
habeas corpus. 16 1 In summary,' 62 the Court noted the severe limitations
of that review, particularly that the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to
assess the legality of the detention and may only evaluate whether the
CSRT proceedings complied with the standards and procedures set forth
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. (citing Letter from President Truman to Secretary of State Byrnes (Nov. 28,
1945), in 8 DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, at 257 (Raymond Dennett &
Robert K. Turner eds., 1948)).
155. Id.
156. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950)).
157. Id. at2262.
158. Id.
159. Id. (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 564 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. The majority opinion in Boumediene compares, in great detail, the substantive
effect of the DTA and CSRT procedures with habeas corpus proceedings. That analysis
is beyond the scope of this essay.
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under the DTA. 163 Moreover, the detainee's opportunity to challenge the
legality of his or her detention during the CSRT proceedings is, itself,
very restricted. 164  Consequently, the Court concluded that the DTA
review process is not an adequate substitute for habeas corpus.161
IV. CONCLUSION
Immediately after the panel discussion, a military official in
attendance approached me and indicated that he had participated in the
initial decision to use Guantanamo Bay to detain foreign nationals seized
in the conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban. He suggested to me that
perhaps the decision had been a mistake. He noted that the entire
purpose behind establishing the detention facilities in Guantanamo in the
first place was to avoid judicial review and intervention in the
executive's detentions. It was apparent that the ensuing litigation had
thwarted that executive purpose. My reply to him was simply that the
executive does not have that right. The Framers recognized the critical
role of checks and balances when defining the constitutional structure of
our government. It is neither the executive's nor the legislature's
prerogative to exempt itself from that structure. I suspect this will be the
most enduring lesson of Boumediene. Indeed, as President Obama
moves to shutter the Guantanamo Bay detention centers within the
year, 166 it would be a mistake to read Boumediene as the Supreme
Court's now-moot response to an ugly, yet soon-to-be closed chapter in
U.S. history. In reminding us of the separation of powers principles that
underpin our nation's identity and political structure and the critical role
that the writ of habeas corpus plays in preserving them, the Court issued
an emphatic affirmation of those fundamental principles.
163. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2265.
164. Id. at 2260.
165. Id. at2274.
166. On January 22, 2009, his second full day in office, President Obama signed an
executive order to close the Guantanamo detention facilities within a year. See Rachel
Weiner, Guantanamo: Obama Executive Order to Close Prison Full Text, HUFFINGTON
POST, Jan. 23, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/22/guantanamo-obamas-
executi_n_160054.html.
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